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Abstract 
Since policymakers increasingly regard foreign aid as a means to manage international flows of 
migrants, it is important to obtain accurate empirical evidence on the complex link between aid and 
migration. Recent research has shown that the impact of foreign assistance on migrant flows is highly 
heterogenous across aid categories. In this paper, we focus on a dimension of heterogeneity that has so 
far not been considered in the literature, namely whether or not the delivery of foreign aid is associated 
with a transfer of resources to the recipient country. We show in a first step that non-transferred aid is 
quantitatively important, accounting for more than 25 percent of overall aid given by OECD DAC 
donors in 2016. Running separate gravity-type regressions for transferred and non-transferred aid, we 
then find that transferred aid has a much stronger (negative) impact on migration than the previously 
used total aid variable that includes the non-transferred component. As may be expected, non-transferred 
aid itself does not appear to affect migrant flows. A high share of non-transferred aid would therefore 
be at odds with donors’ stated goal of tackling the root causes of migration. 
Keywords 
Foreign Aid, Migration 
JEL: F22, F35, O15 
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1. Introduction* 
At least since the large movements of refugees and other migrants to the EU in 2015, many policymakers 
see the scaling-up of foreign aid as a key instrument to stem migrant inflows. The underlying argument 
is that long-term development assistance can help address the root causes of migration through the 
creation of earning opportunities, quality education and better public services, thereby giving people an 
incentive to stay at home.  
When it comes to assessing the impact of aid on emigration in order to verify whether policymakers’ 
claims are justified, a main challenge is to account for the heterogeneity of the relationship between aid 
and migration – which is to be expected since aid can serve many different purposes, ranging from 
support of civil society to the establishment of large-scale infrastructure. Recent empirical research has 
provided some evidence in this regard by disaggregating foreign aid along various lines. For example, 
Lanati and Thiele (2018b) hypothesise that, broadly speaking, foreign aid can either raise incomes or 
improve public service provision within recipient countries. Using Clemens et al.’s (2012) distinction 
between early-impact aid, which may generate income growth in the short to medium term, and late-
impact aid, which immediately affects non-monetary dimensions of well-being but may lead to higher 
incomes only in the very long run, Lanati and Thiele find that a rise in late-impact aid is associated with 
falling emigration rates. Gamso and Yuldashev (2018a) compare the effects of rural and urban 
development aid on international migration. They find that countries that receive larger amounts of rural 
development aid have lower emigration rates, which is mainly attributed to additional investments in 
agricultural sector capacity building. By contrast, no significant link could be detected between aid to 
urban areas and migration.  
Two further studies by Lanati and Thiele (2018a) and Gamso and Yuldashev (2018b) detect 
differential impacts on migration across sectoral aid categories. Lanati and Thiele (2018a) investigate 
the relationships between emigration rates and inflows of aid for social infrastructure, physical 
infrastructure and production sectors. All three aid categories have a statistically significant negative 
effect on emigration rates, but only the impact of aid to the social sector is relevant in quantitative terms. 
According to the estimates provided by Gamso and Yuldashev (2018b), emigration rates are lower 
where governance aid is higher, whereas aid intended to promote economic or social development does 
not affect emigration rates.  
A common pattern that emerges from all these studies is that any major impacts of aid on migration 
tend to run through improved public services that provide incentives for people to stay in their home 
countries. There is no indication of empirically relevant income-enhancing effects of foreign aid that 
might give rise to increased emigration by allowing would-be migrants to incur the costs of moving to 
destination countries.  
In this paper, we focus on another important dimension of heterogeneity that has so far been 
neglected in the literature, namely whether or not the delivery of foreign aid is actually associated with 
a transfer of resources to the recipient country. We depart from Qian’s (2015) observation that a 
substantial share of the foreign aid reported by OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
donors is spent within their own borders. This so-called non-transferred aid is usually not considered a 
separate analytical category, even though it can be expected to differ fundamentally from transferred 
aid as concerns its impact on outcome variables such as emigration rates.1 In line with the discussion 
                                                     
* The authors are grateful to Martin Ruhs, João Santos Silva, Jean-Christophe Dumont and the participants at an OECD 
research seminar in Paris for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Stiftung Mercator for ﬁnancial support 
under project number PN 14-297. 
1 Note that the inaccuracies that may result from simply aggregating transferred and non-transferred aid are not restricted to 
the estimates of the aid-migration relationship presented in this paper. A similar reasoning applies to large parts of the aid 
effectiveness literature, including the long-standing controversy on whether foreign aid raises economic growth.  
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above, aid that involves a transfer of resources to the recipient country may affect migration decisions 
through raising individual incomes and/or improving the quality of public services. By contrast, in the 
absence of a resource transfer would-be migrants do not experience such direct tangible benefits, which 
implies that non-transferred aid is unlikely to be effective in tackling the root causes of migration. There 
may still be some indirect impacts of non-transferred aid on migration, for example if experts paid by 
donor governments provide useful advice that helps improve institutional quality in recipient countries. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we update and extend Qian’s (2015) previous 
account of the non-transferred aid delivered by OECD donors. In particular, we discuss in some detail 
how spending on refugees within donor countries evolved after the recent refugee crisis, and why such 
spending is regarded as part of international development cooperation at all. It turns out that the surge 
in foreign aid since 2015 has largely been driven by steeply increasing in-donor refugee costs. Second, 
we analyse whether and to what extent separating transferred aid from non-transferred aid qualifies 
previous estimates of the relationship between aid and migration. To the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to make this distinction in the empirical aid effectiveness literature. Our regression results 
suggest that transferred aid has a markedly stronger impact on migration than total aid including the 
non-transferred component. Future research will have to show whether this carries over to other parts of 
the aid effectiveness debate, such as the link between foreign aid and economic growth. As expected, 
non-transferred aid itself does not appear to affect migrant flows. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the 
composition and quantitative importance of non-transferred aid in OECD DAC donor countries, putting 
a focus on the 10 donors with the largest aid disbursements. Section 3 first describes the econometric 
approach as well as the data employed in the empirical analysis, and then presents and discusses the 
regression results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The Significance and Pattern of Non-Transferred Aid 
We divide foreign aid into transferred and non-transferred aid based on the classification proposed by 
Qian (2015). Non-transferred aid comprises all forms of assistance spent within donor borders such as 
School Training, Imputed Student Costs, Administrative Costs, Development Awareness, Refugee Costs 
and Debt Relief (see Table A1 for a brief description of each item). We add to Qian’s classification the 
volume of aid spent on Donor Personnel, which includes costs for experts, consultants, teachers, 
academics, researchers, volunteers and contributions to public and private bodies for sending experts to 
developing countries. Debt Relief is included because technically it is not considered a transfer of new 
resources to recipient countries. However, unlike the other modes of non-transferred aid delivery, it may 
give rise to an indirect transfer of resources: reducing the overall debt burden could raise economic 
growth, e.g. through higher private or public investment (see, for example, Marcelino and Hakobyan, 
2014). It could also encourage governments to spend more on public services such as schools and health 
care services, which in turn may curtail emigration. In one of our robustness checks below we address 
this issue by separately estimating whether a rising share of debt relief in total aid leads to changes in 
emigration levels. 
Among the remaining components of non-transferred aid, in-donor refugee costs stand out. Unlike 
other items such as awareness campaigns, which might help raise support in donor countries for scaling 
up foreign aid, they are virtually unrelated to development in recipient countries. One might therefore 
wonder why these costs count as official development aid (ODA) at all.2 The OECD’s DAC argues that 
expenditures in donor countries for the sustenance of refugees – including food, shelter and training – 
                                                     
2 One might be inclined to suspect that the countries most affected by the recent refugee crisis lobbied to count the costs of 
hosting the refugees as part of their ODA quota. This is not the case, however: specific instructions on the reporting of in-
donor refugee costs were already introduced by the OECD’s DAC in 1988 (OECD, 2016).   
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during the first twelve months of their stay constitute a kind of humanitarian assistance for those who 
are forced to leave their home countries (OECD, 2018). In doing so, the organisation deviates from its 
general principle of defining development aid as assistance to developing countries and the people living 
in these countries.  
Figure 1 plots the percentage of foreign assistance that is not transferred to the recipient country over 
the period 2006 to 2016 for the top 10 donors (in 2013) and for all members of the OECD’s DAC 
combined. From a peak of almost one third in 2006, the share of non-transferred aid for all DAC 
members fell to about 20% and roughly stayed at that level until 2014. It rose again in the period 2014-
2016, from 18% to 26%. The two large non-EU donors – Japan and the United States – tend to rely less 
on non-transferred aid than the average, while EU countries with the exception of the United Kingdom 
generally spend larger portions of foreign assistance within their own borders. Interestingly, this pattern 
applies to both traditional as well as new EU donors. Table A2 in the Appendix shows that in 2016 ex-
communist EU members such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia and Lithuania 
delivered more than 40% of their aid in the form of non-transferred assistance. 
From Figure 2, which depicts non-transferred aid by type for all donor countries over time, it can 
clearly be seen that the peak in 2006 is due to exceptionally high debt relief,3 whereas the recent rise in 
non-transferred aid has predominently resulted from an increase in in-donor refugee costs.4 Other forms 
of non-transferred aid have remained roughly constant over the period under consideration.  
The recent surge in in-donor refugee costs is undoubtedly related to the 2015 European refugee crisis 
and the arrival of unprecedented numbers of migrants on the Southern European coasts. This becomes 
obvious when looking at the most affected EU countries.5 Among the preferred final destinations for 
refugees, Germany increased foreign assistance in the form of refugee costs from 1% to 30% of total 
ODA over the period 2014-2016, while in the case of Sweden the share almost doubled from 25% in 
2014 to 49% in 2015 (Figure 3). For Italy and Greece, the main EU countries of first arrival for irregular 
migrants, refugee costs even accounted for the vast majority of the foreign aid budget in 2016, with 66% 
and 92% respectively (Table A2).  
3. Econometric Analysis 
Having shown that non-transferred aid is a relevant category in quantitative terms, we now investigate 
empirically how taking it explicitly into account affects estimates of the relationship between aid and 
migration. 
a. Method and Data 
Our econometric specification builds on a standard gravity model of international migration (e.g. Beine 
and Parsons, 2015), to which we add the overall aid received by country i from all donors j as a factor 
potentially affecting migration decisions, along the lines of previous studies by Berthélemy et al. (2009) 
as well as Lanati and Thiele (2018a, 2018b). The baseline regression equation is given by  
                                𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑂𝑖𝑡−2 ∗ ∇  + 𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−2 ∗ ϑ + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡                               (1) 
                                                     
3 See Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2013) for a discussion of the debt-related measures – for example large-scale debt reductions 
for Nigeria and Iraq, but also debt relief operations within the framework of the HIPC initiative – that were taken in the 
mid-2000s.  
4 The recent rise in overall aid disbursements reported for OECD DAC donors is largely due to the surge in refugee costs 
(OECD, 2017).  
5 It has to be noted that data on in-donor refugee costs are not necessarily comparable between donors as reporting practices 
vary in terms of categories of refugees included, types of expenditures covered and methodology used to assess costs 
(OECD, 2016).  
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Bilateral emigration flows 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 from origin i to destination j are regressed on a number of origin-
specific factors 𝑂𝑖𝑡−2 as well as dyadic factors 𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡−2.
6 In addition to the aggregate aid received by 
country i, we consider a standard set of origin-specific control variables. These comprise socioconomic 
push factors (GDP per capita and the share of unemployed people), a variable that controls for the quality 
of governance (political stability), the incidence of conflict, demographic push factors at origin – which 
we capture by the total dependency ratio, i.e. the total population aged less than 15 or over 64 as a share 
of the working age population – and the size of the population. We are not including destination 
characteristics, as the impact of those factors will be absorbed by the inclusion of destination-time fixed 
effects. Among the dyadic determinants we distinguish time-varying migrant network effects, which we 
capture by the pre-determined stock of migrants from country 𝑖 living in country j, from a time-invariant 
component of migration costs proxied by physical and linguistic distance as well as past colonial 
relationships. 
All the covariates are predetermined with respect to migration flows, with a lag of two periods (𝑡 −
2). This at least partly addresses concerns that our aid variable may be endogenous due to reverse 
causality.7 In addition, only the bilateral part of the total ODA that country i receives is potentially 
affected by migration from country i to country j, e.g. because migrants successfully lobby the 
government in the destination country to allocate more aid to their country of origin (Lahiri and 
Raimondos-Møller 2000). We are therefore confident that reverse causality is not a major issue in our 
estimation, but still refrain from making strong causal claims regarding the link between aid and 
migration.   
To further attentuate potential estimation biases, we include origin (𝛼𝑖) as well as destination-time 
(𝛼𝑗𝑡) fixed effects. In particular, the inclusion of 𝛼𝑗𝑡  absorbs the impact of migration policies, which are 
likely to be highly significant drivers of migration decisions but for which data are often not readily 
available. This specification also allows us to account for multilateral resistance to migration.8 Failing 
to do so in the gravity framework could lead to significant biases in the estimated coefficients of the 
determinants of migration (Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2013). The inclusion of destination-
time fixed effects will completely account for multilateral resistance to migration in receiving countries, 
which is likely to be the most imptortant factor in the context of international migration, given the key 
role that migration policies of the destination country play (Beine and Parsons, 2015). Moreover, in the 
Appendix we show that adding origin-time dummies to Equation 1 leaves all the dyadic coefficients 
substantially unchanged (Table A5).9 The resulting estimates of origin-year fixed effects are then used 
as the dependent variable to estimate the impact of foreign aid with a two-step approach (Table A6).10 
The estimated coefficients are in line with the standard regression results presented in this paper. This 
makes us confident that our model effectively captures multilateral resistance to migration in origin 
countries as well. 
                                                     
6 As in some previous studies (see for instance Ortega and Peri, 2013; Berthélemy et al., 2009), we regress bilateral 
emigration on origin-specific factors such as the volume of ODA received, controlling for the size of origin’s population. 
This is roughly equivalent empirically to estimating the effect of ODA per capita on bilateral emigration rates. We 
alternatively ran the regression with emigration rates as the dependent variable (Table A3 in the Appendix) and obtained 
very similar results for our main variables of interest, which we find reassuring.  
7 Predetermined values with larger lags would further attenuate the issue of reverse causality; however, they also lead to a 
smaller sample size due to the reduced time-span. We estimated Equation (1) using controls at different lags (𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 −
4) and obtained similar results (available upon request).  
8 Multilateral resistance to migration denotes the fact that the choice of a potential migrant to move to a given destination 
country depends not only on the attractiveness of the country of destination relative to the country of origin, but also on 
how this relates to the opportunities to move to other destinations. 
9 This result is in line with Parsons (2012). 
10 A detailed discussion of the two-step approach applied to gravity models is provided by Head and Mayer (2014). 
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Regressions are run separately on transferred aid as well as non-transferred aid using the 
classification discussed above. In accordance with previous gravity model applications (e.g. Beine and 
Parsons, 2015), we rely on the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) approach to estimate 
Equation (1). Our preferred choice is driven by the share of zeros that is fairly low but not negligible 
(around 12% of total observations). As Silva and Tenreyro (2006) pointed out, the presence of zeros 
creates correlation between the covariates and the error term, leading to an inconsistency of OLS 
estimates. To check for the robustness of our results, we compare the PPML estimates of Equation (1) 
with their OLS counterparts.  
The sample used in the econometric analysis includes 29 donor (migrant destination) countries and 
125 recipient (migrant origin) countries. The period under consideration is 2009–2016. For total aid 
received – our main variable of interest – data are gross disbursements expressed in 2016 constant US 
dollars from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) dataset. Non-reported values of ODA are 
treated as zeros. Data on migration – both the bilateral stocks of immigrants born in country i and 
resident in country j as well as the annual bilateral migration flows – are from the OECD international 
migration database.11 The missing observations in the migration dataset are automatically dropped. We 
take three- years averages (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 − 3) for the total aid received to account for the volatility of annual 
aid flows. The rest of the covariates are constructed and have the same source as described in Lanati and 
Thiele (2018a). Basic descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table A3 of the Appendix.  
b. Regression Results 
Table 1 reports our baseline estimates of Equation (1) using PPML (columns 1-3) and OLS (columns 4-
6). The model is estimated for total ODA as well as the transferred and non-transferred aid components. 
Our main variable of interest – the aggregate ODA received – is negatively associated with migration 
flows. In line with Lanati and Thiele (2018a; 2018b), the effect of total ODA on emigration is moderate 
but non-negligible: a 10% increase in ODA would decrease bilateral emigration on average by 1%. The 
impact of transferred aid on migration is about 50% higher than that of total ODA, whereas non-
transferred assistance does not seem to affect emigration. Reassuringly, this pattern holds across 
estimators, although the coefficients of our variable of interest are lower in absolute value when 
estimated using a log linear model.12  
Among the control variables, all those that are significant have the expected sign. A larger diaspora, 
linguistic affinity and a colonial relationship all spur migration flows. Conversely, the larger the distance 
between origin and destination (i.e. the greater the migration costs), the lower, on average, the associated 
migration flows. The dependency ratio also has the expected negative effect on migration flows: a high 
total dependency ratio indicates a scarcity of workers to support both the young and the elderly, which 
reduces the likelihood of emigration. As hypothesised, unemployment in countries of origin constitutes 
a push factor for would-be migrants. The impacts of income at origin, political stability, conflict and 
                                                     
11 We are aware of the limitations of the OECD International Migration Database regarding the comparability across OECD 
destinations (see Ortega and Peri (2013) and Mayda (2010) for a discussion). While the existing inconsistencies can make 
a pure cross-country comparison inaccurate, it is reasonable to argue that changes over time can be compared. To test the 
robustness of our results, we re-estimate Equation (1) using migration data from Eurostat for a subsample of European 
destinations. For these destinations, migration statistics are calculated according to more harmonised criteria (see Eurostat 
(2018) for information on the comparability of the Eurostat dataset). The estimates, which are available upon request, are 
in line with the results presented in this paper.  
12 The results of estimating Equation (1) are also similar when using the Tobit approach (EK Tobit) suggested by Eaton and 
Kortum (2001), which according to Head and Mayer’s (2014) Monte-Carlo simulations provides consistent estimates in 
the presence of a substantial share of zeros. The statistics of this robustness check are not shown but are available upon 
request.  
Foreign Assistance and Emigration: Accounting for the Role of Non-Transferred Aid 
6 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
 
population are insignificant.13 The first three of these variables have already been found to have 
ambiguous effects in previous research (see, for instance, Ortega and Peri, 2013; Beine and Parsons, 
2015; Lanati and Thiele, 2018a).  
The insignificant coefficient of population is surprising given the use of emigration flows as a 
dependent variable; it may signal model mis-specification due to omitted variables. To address this issue, 
we augment the gravity specification by including asymmetric-dyadic fixed effects, which capture 
unobserved factors potentially correlated both with the error term and the explanatory variables (Faye 
and Niehaus, 2012; Lanati and Thiele, 2018b). As shown in Table 2, the coefficients for the control 
variables maintain the same sign as in the previous model; however, the effects of population, income 
per capita and political stability all become statistically significant. The estimated impact of the ODA 
received is slightly lower than in the baseline for both transferred and non-transferred aid, with the latter 
again being statistically insignificant, leaving the conclusion of the baseline regression substantially 
unaffected.  
Furthermore, our disaggregated analysis has potential limitations that are a consequence of the macro 
orientation of the research question, i.e. the aim to explain the aggregate migration response to foreign 
aid. While the share of non-transferred aid is fairly substantial (see Figure 1), the exclusion of all the 
volume of transferred assistance in Equation (1) may lead to biased estimates due to model mis-
specification. To address this omitted-variable bias, we follow Aleksynska and Peri (2014) and use the 
fact that the value of ODA labelled as “non-transferred” (Non-Transferred Aid), is equal to aggregate 
ODA (Aggregate Aid) multiplied by the corresponding share of non-transferred aid (Non-Transferred 
Share), i.e. Non-Transferred Aid = Aggregate Aid * Non-Transferred Share. Hence, by taking logs and 
using log properties, we can separate the effect into two terms: ln (Aggregate Aid) + ln (Non-Transferred 
Share). The same reasoning applies to the main components of non-transferred aid such as Debt Relief, 
Administrative Costs and Refugee Costs, as well as for transferred aid. The advantage of this type of 
specification is that aggregate ODA absorbs omitted variables that affect both aid and migration, 
allowing us to isolate and disentangle the extra impact of transferred aid and different non-transferred 
aid categories on migration flows. In accordance with our predictions, the results reported in Table 3 
suggest that an increase in the share of non-transferred assistance does not affect the decision to 
emigrate. This also holds for the specific components of non-transferred aid, including debt relief, which 
we argued above might indirectly shape the incentives of would-be migrants. By contrast, a higher share 
of transferred aid is clearly associated with lower emigration.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have first shown that non-transferred aid accounts for a substantial share of overall 
ODA given by OECD DAC donors, and that the recent scaling-up of aid reported by the OECD is 
predominently due to a steep increase in in-donor refugee costs. In a second step, we have examined the 
role of non-transferred aid in estimating the relationship between aid and migration. Running separate 
regressions for transferred and non-transferred aid, we obtain robust evidence that only the former has 
a statistically significant (negative) effect on emigration from developing countries. The high share of 
non-transferred aid that we observe for various donors is therefore at odds with the frequently stated 
goal of tackling the root causes of migration. Such spending may serve important purposes, e.g. to assist 
arriving refugees in meeting their basic needs, but it is not the same as transferring resources to 
developing countries. Including the non-transferred categories in overall aid figures overestimates the 
amount of money available for improving living conditions in low-income countries. 
                                                     
13 The results are robust to the inclusion of alternative institutional variables which proxy for the quality of the recipients’ 
government (Regulatory Quality) and democracy (Voice and Accountability). The estimates of these alternative 
specifications are available upon request.  
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Our results for transferred aid point in the same direction as previous research that points to a 
dampening effect of aid on migration through the provision of public services. In quantitative terms, 
transferred aid has a markedly stronger impact on migration than total aid including the non-transferred 
component, but the link is still fairly modest: taking our point estimates at face value, a doubling of 
transferred aid would lower emigration by about 15%. The rise in aid that would translate into a sizeable 
reduction of emigration thus appears to be unrealistically high.  
From a conceptual point of view, it is important to note that the relevance of accounting for non-
transferred aid is not limited to the relationship between aid and migration. Whether or not aid is spent 
in the recipient country is, for example, also likely to matter in terms of its impact on economic growth. 
Future research that makes a distinction between transferred and non-transferred aid in aid-growth 
regressions in order to check whether previous results hold up would be highly welcome as it might add 
a new perspective to one of the most controversial debates in the international development literature.  
A further promising avenue for future research would be to consider heterogeneity not only in foreign 
aid but also in the migration variable. The only existing study that does so is Moullan (2013), who 
examines the impact of aid targeted at the health sector on the emigration rates of physicians. Additional 
analyses along these lines – for instance regarding the association between aid for higher education and 
the emigration of students, or the differential impact of different kinds of aid on high-skilled versus low-
skilled emigration from developing countries – would help obtain a more nuanced picture of the link 
between aid and migration that can better inform policymaking.  
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Fig. 1: Non-Transferred Aid for Top 10 donors and for all DAC Countries combined, 2006-2016 
 
Notes: A top donor is defined according to ODA disbursement in 2013. Data taken from the OECD. 
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Fig. 2: Non-Transferred Aid by type for all donors, 2006–2016 
 
Notes: All values are shown in 2016 USD. Data taken from the OECD. 
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Fig. 3: Refugee Costs for Top 10 donors and for all DAC Countries combined, 2006-2016 
 
Notes: A top donor is defined according to ODA disbursement in 2013. Data taken from the OECD. 
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Table 1 – Baseline Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimator 
Dep. Variable 
ODA Type 
 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Total ODA 
3 Years Avg. 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Transf. ODA 
3 Years Avg. 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Non-Transf. ODA 
3 Years Avg. 
OLS 
Log Emigrants 
Total ODA 
3 Years Avg. 
OLS 
Log Emigrants 
Transf. ODA 
3 Years Avg. 
OLS 
Log Emigrants 
Non-Transf. ODA 
3 Years Avg. 
Log Diaspora (o to d) 0.623*** 0.623*** 0.622*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 
 (41.47) (41.52) (41.41) (55.42) (55.44) (55.37) 
       
Log GDP (o) 0.268 0.179 0.381 -0.0587 -0.0740 -0.0373 
 (1.30) (0.88) (1.84) (-0.42) (-0.53) (-0.27) 
       
Log ODA (o) -0.106* -0.165*** -0.0281 -0.0617 -0.0915** -0.0172 
 (-2.15) (-3.38) (-1.09) (-1.95) (-2.63) (-1.32) 
       
Log Distance (o d) -0.327*** -0.326*** -0.327*** -0.334*** -0.335*** -0.334*** 
 (-11.03) (-11.07) (-10.98) (-12.42) (-12.42) (-12.40) 
       
Common Language (o d) 0.297*** 0.298*** 0.296*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.326*** 
 (7.19) (7.21) (7.20) (9.02) (9.01) (9.02) 
       
Log Population (o) 0.718 0.921 0.647 -0.346 -0.277 -0.374 
 (0.82) (1.07) (0.68) (-1.00) (-0.81) (-1.03) 
       
Dependency Ratio (o) -0.0450*** -0.0456*** -0.0439*** -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0115 
 (-3.95) (-4.16) (-3.75) (-1.96) (-1.96) (-1.92) 
       
Conflict (o) 0.0698 0.0871 0.0561 0.0137 0.0206 0.00842 
 (1.20) (1.51) (0.95) (0.39) (0.58) (0.24) 
       
Political Stability (o) -0.0843 -0.0979 -0.0636 -0.0762* -0.0829* -0.0671 
 (-1.29) (-1.50) (-0.97) (-2.18) (-2.38) (-1.90) 
       
Unemployment (o) 0.0326* 0.0323* 0.0321* 0.0116 0.0115 0.0101 
 (2.51) (2.48) (2.50) (1.60) (1.60) (1.41) 
       
N 
Dest*Year FE 
Origin FE 
Zeros 
Destination Countries  
Origin countries 
12537 
X 
X 
1,356 
29 
125 
12537 
X 
X 
1,356 
29 
125 
12537 
X 
X 
1,356 
29 
125 
11181 
X 
X 
0 
29 
125 
11181 
X 
X 
0 
29 
125 
11181 
X 
X 
0 
29 
125 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Robust Standard Errors are included. The model includes the intercept. For foreign aid we take the 3-year average. So total ODA received at time t -1 is the 3-years average between t - 1 and t - 3. The first 3 
columns show the estimates of Eq. (1) using PPML for total, transferred and non-transferred aid, respectively. Columns 4-6 report the correspondent estimates using OLS.  
Table 2 – Adding Dyadic Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimator 
Dep. Variable 
ODA Type 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Total ODA 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Transf. ODA 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Non-Transf. ODA 
Log Diaspora (o to d) 0.114 0.109 0.118* 
 (1.90) (1.82) (1.97) 
    
Log GDP (o) 0.465*** 0.371** 0.556*** 
 (3.36) (2.69) (3.96) 
    
Log ODA (o) -0.0822* -0.147*** -0.0144 
 (-2.39) (-4.63) (-0.79) 
    
Log Population (o) 1.086* 1.244* 1.123* 
 (2.03) (2.31) (2.02) 
    
Dependency Ratio (o) -0.0410*** -0.0419*** -0.0397*** 
 (-5.42) (-5.91) (-5.15) 
    
Conflict (o) 0.0231 0.0383 0.0143 
 (0.56) (0.94) (0.34) 
    
Political Stability (o) -0.139*** -0.153*** -0.124** 
 (-3.51) (-3.95) (-3.19) 
    
Unemployment (o) 0.0341*** 0.0338*** 0.0339*** 
 (3.80) (3.77) (3.76) 
    
N 
Dest*Year FE 
Dest*Origin FE 
Zeros 
Destination Countries  
Origin countries 
11574 
X 
X 
954 
22 
125 
11574 
X 
X 
954 
22 
125 
11574 
X 
X 
954 
22 
125 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robust Standard Errors are included. The model includes asymmetric dyadic fixed effects.  
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Table 3 – Including ODA Shares  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimator 
Dep. Variable 
Share ODA 
PPML 
Emigrants 
 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Transferred 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Non-Transferred 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Debt Relief 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Refugee Costs 
PPML 
Emigrants 
Admin.Costs 
Log Diaspora (o to d) 0.114 0.105 0.112 0.113 0.121* 0.113 
 (1.90) (1.77) (1.86) (1.90) (2.02) (1.89) 
       
Log GDP (o) 0.465*** 0.339* 0.446** 0.466*** 0.499*** 0.459*** 
 (3.36) (2.54) (3.26) (3.38) (3.48) (3.31) 
       
Log ODA (o) -0.0822* -0.156*** -0.0906** -0.0834* -0.0807* -0.0763* 
 (-2.39) (-4.85) (-2.89) (-2.52) (-2.37) (-2.13) 
       
Log Share ODA (o)  -0.390*** 0.0183 0.000313 0.00329 0.00641 
  (-3.77) (0.89) (0.13) (1.56) (0.32) 
       
Log Population (o) 1.086* 1.820** 1.269* 1.101* 1.112* 1.057* 
 (2.03) (3.27) (2.27) (2.08) (2.07) (2.04) 
       
Dependency Ratio (o) -0.0410*** -0.0406*** -0.0406*** -0.0410*** -0.0399*** -0.0409*** 
 (-5.42) (-6.00) (-5.35) (-5.40) (-5.25) (-5.37) 
       
Conflict (o) 0.0231 0.0566 0.0280 0.0238 0.0202 0.0218 
 (0.56) (1.36) (0.67) (0.57) (0.49) (0.53) 
       
Political Stability (o) -0.139*** -0.163*** -0.147*** -0.139*** -0.137*** -0.138*** 
 (-3.51) (-4.21) (-3.71) (-3.53) (-3.48) (-3.52) 
       
Unemployment (o) 0.0341*** 0.0334*** 0.0344*** 0.0341*** 0.0341*** 0.0341*** 
 (3.80) (3.71) (3.82) (3.79) (3.81) (3.82) 
       
N 
Dest*Year FE 
Dest*Origin FE 
Zeros 
Destination Countries  
Origin countries 
11574 
X 
X 
954 
22 
125 
11574 
X 
X 
954 
22 
125 
11574 
X 
X 
954 
22 
125 
11574 
X 
X 
954 
22 
125 
11574 
X 
X 
954 
22 
125 
11574 
X 
X 
954 
22 
125 
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robust Standard Errors are included. Columns 3-6 report the estimates of Eq. (1) in which the effect of non-transferred aid is separated into two terms: ln (Aggregate Aid) + ln (Non-Transferred Share). 
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Table A1: Non-Transferred Aid - Categories 
 
Category 
 
Short description 
 
 
Debt relief   
Any form of debt reorganisation which relieves the overall burden of debt. It encompasses all actions relating to debt 
(forgiveness, conversions, swaps, buy-backs, rescheduling, refinancing). 
Development Awareness 
 
Spending in donor country for heightened awareness/interest in development co-operation designed to increase public 
support (brochures, lectures, special research projects, etc.). 
 
Imputed Student Costs  Indirect (“imputed”) costs of tuition in donor countries. 
 
Administrative Costs  
 
Administrative costs of development assistance programmes not already included under other ODA items as an integral part 
of the costs of delivering or implementing the aid provided. This category covers situation analyses and auditing activities.As 
regards the salaries component of administrative costs, it relates to  in-house agency staff and contractors only; costs 
associated with donor experts/consultants are to be reported under category Donor Personnel or Project Type Interventions. 
Refugee Costs 
 
Official sector expenditures for the sustenance of refugees in donor countries during the first twelve months of their stay. 
 
 
School Training   
 
Financial aid awards for individual students and contributions to trainees. 
Donor Personnel   
Costs for experts, consultants, teachers, academics, researchers, volunteers and contributions to public and private bodies for 
sending experts to developing countries 
  
Source: OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/type-aid.htm   
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